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Abstract
This paper describes a formalism that
subsumes Peterson’s intermediate quan-
tifier syllogistic system, and extends the
ideas by van Eijck on Aristotle’s logic.
Syllogisms are expressed in a concise
form making use of and extending the
Monotonicity Calculus. Contradictory
and contrary relationships are added so
that deduction can derive propositions ex-
pressing a form of negation.
1 Introduction
1.1 Aim/Purpose
Monotonicity Calculus is one possible compo-
nent of Natural Logic (Moss 2012). Monotonic-
ity Calculus can be used to formalise Syllogistic
Logic, as shown by Van Eijck (2005).
Syllogistic Logic is a logic based on quanti-
fied propositions expressed on terms, given two
quantified propositions, called premises. For in-
stance from “Some Athenians are women” and
“All women are humans”, a third one can be in-
ferred with certainty “Some Athenians are hu-
mans”.
Monotonicity Calculus uses the order induced
by set containment and the monotonicity behaviour
of quantified sentences to express logical implica-
tion. For instance, the quantifier “All” is downward
monotonic in its left-hand argument and upward in
its right hand argument, see e.g. (Van Benthem
2007), exemplifying the patterns
↓ MON QAB A′ ⊆ A / QA′B (1)
That is, if “All humans are mortals”, “All women
are mortals”, and
MON ↑ QAB B ⊆ B′ / QAB′ (2)
That is, if “All humans are mortals”, “All humans
are living beings”.
In this paper we extend the Monotonicity
Calculus, so that it captures not only the tradi-
tional Aristotelian syllogistic inferences on propo-
sitions with ‘all’, ‘no’, ‘some’ and ‘some ... not’,
but also inferences involving additional quantifiers
such as ‘almost all’, ‘few’, ‘most’, ‘most ... not’,
‘many’ and ‘many ... not’. These are referred
to by Peterson (2000) as intermediate quantifiers.
This naming reflects their position in the ‘extended
square of opposition’ (see Fig. 1). The logic sys-
tem we propose is based on an ordering of quanti-
fiers and operators that capture the relations present
in the graph structure of the extended square of op-
position. That is we:
1. consider negation relationships, i.e. propo-
sition negation and contrary and contradic-
tory inference between quantified proposi-
tions, and intermediate quantifiers.
2. provide a generalisation of syllogistic logic
so that we subsume Aristotle’s and Peter-
son’s systems, under certain assumptions on
non-empty terms.
3. provide a formalism whose components can
be modified in order to make the system
more expressive (e.g. by using more quan-
tifiers, by using relationships as parameters
of quantifiers, etc.).
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Only linear ordering between quantified proposi-
tions, based on logical implication, is studied.
1.2 Importance
The main contribution of this paper is in propos-
ing a logic formalism based on pairs of propo-
sitions expressed by intermediate quantifiers and
their negation. Inference is obtained by ordering
properties of quantified propositions and by two
operators that capture the relations of the "extended
square of opposition". This square is a graph (Fig-
ure 1) that expresses the implication, contradiction
and (sub)contrariness relationship between propo-
sitions.
Apart from its theoretical interest, the proposed
system may have practical applications. For in-
stance, we are currently working on implement-
ing a question generation system (Iero 2017) that
can automatically generate comprehension ques-
tions from text that includes intermediate quanti-
fiers. An inference engine based on the logical sys-
tem proposed in this paper is part of the question
generator that we are developing.
2 Related Work
Natural Logic dates back to Aristotle’s 4th century
BC syllogisms (Karttunen 2015). Charles Sander
Peirce studied a linguistic phenomenon linked to
this specific logic, called monotonicity, in the con-
text of formal languages. Natural Logic was re-
vived by the studies of Johan van Benthem and
his student Victor Sánchez-Valencia in the 1990s
(Valencia 1991). A Natural Logic approach is
based on the idea that deciding whether inference
is logically sound can be done using syntactic fea-
tures, as opposed to formal logic approaches where
a logical form is derived and reasoning is per-
formed based on it. Although van Benthem cru-
cially linked it with categorial grammars, MacCart-
ney and Manning (2007) show that other formali-
sations can be used instead.
Parsons (2017) gives a historical context to the
traditional square. The square of opposition con-
nects quantified propositions by contrary relation-
ship, when two propositions cannot be true to-
gether, subcontrary relationship, when two propo-
sitions cannot both be false together and contra-
dictory relationship, when two propositions have
opposite truth values. Van Eijck (2005) gives a
system expressed in terms of monotonicity, sym-
metry and existential import, that is the assump-
tion that the terms exist, for Aristotle’s syllogis-
tic logic. In this way syllogisms are connected
to modern studies on Natural Logic, beginning a
path of unification between ancient logic and mod-
ern theories of logic in language. However, in van
Eijck’s paper, the inferences that can be obtained
by contradictory and contrary relationships are not
taken into account (as for instance deriving “It is
not the case that no woman is mortal” from “Some
woman is mortal”).
3 Description Of the System
Our system is based on Peterson’s intermediate
quantifiers theory (Peterson 2000).
Making use of the ordering properties of quan-
tifiers, we propose a way to extend the Monotonic-
ity Calculus with Peterson’s intermediate quanti-
fiers. This requires two new operators: one for mir-
roring the orderings and one for relating elements
from one ordering to the other (i.e. from affirma-
tive to negative or vice versa).
3.1 The Set of Symbols
The class of symbols describing the syllogistic lan-
guage can be subdivided in four groups.
1. Terms
2. Quantifiers
3. Negation
4. Syntactic Delimiters
3.1.1 Terms
A sequence of alphanumeric characters in the Ro-
man alphabet starting with a capital letter denotes a
term, that is a subject or a predicate. Also an under-
score character can be used in the sequence denot-
ing a term (e.g. “Document_writer”). For instance
“Man”, “Mortal” are terms. “men” and ”mortal”
are not terms.
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3.1.2 Quantifiers
Any sequence of alphanumeric roman characters in
lowercase starting with letter and possibly contain-
ing an underscore (“_”) denotes a quantifier. The
behaviour of quantifiers is defined separately.
Although, in general, any number of quan-
tifiers can be defined in the language, only
a specific number of them will be given for
this version of the logic. This version of
the logic will contain: “all”, “no”, “some”,
“some_not”, “almost_all”, “most”, “many”,
“few”, “most_not”, “many_not”.
3.1.3 Syntactic Delimiters
Brackets are used to separate terms from quanti-
fiers. They do not have any linguistic nor logical
value, they are just meant to improve human read-
ability of the logic.
3.1.4 Negation
Proposition negation is expressed by the symbol
‘∼’ in front of a proposition and it is read as “It
is not the case that”. For instance the proposition
∼ all(Men)(Astronauts) (3)
should be read as “It is not the case that all men are
astronauts”, that can be simplified in “Not all men
are astronauts”.
3.2 The Grammar
In this section we give a categorial grammar
(Lambek 1958) for the fragments of the syllogis-
tic language that we will be using. Forward appli-
cation only is sufficient to prove that a sentence is
well formed.
We define the set of quantifiers
q : (Pp/Pr)/Pr where q ∈ {all ,
no,
some ,
some_not ,
almost_all ,
most ,
many ,
few ,
most_not ,
many_not}
(4)
the vocabulary of terms (nouns, predicates):
T : Pr where T ∈ {Woman,
Man,
Mortal, . . . }
(5)
The proof of the assignment of the type Pp
(Prop) to q(X)(Y) follows.
q
(Pp/Pr)/Pr
(X)
Pr
Pp/Pr
(Y )
Pr
( A well formed Proposition )
Pp
q is a quantifier, (X), (Y) are terms.
3.3 The Definitions
3.3.1 Ordering on Quantifiers
Definition 3.1. We define the following ordered set
as the set of affirmative quantifiers:
A = (A : every,
P : almost_all,
T : most,
K : many,
I : some)
(6)
The ordering is total (<) according to the se-
quence expressed in Equation (6). However it is
related to the boolean implication represented in
Figure 1. Therefore the sign ⊏ will be used in-
stead.
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Definition 3.2. In a similar way we define the fol-
lowing totally ordered set:
E = (E : no,
B : few,
D : most_not,
G : many_not,
O : some_not)
(7)
as the set of negative quantifiers.
The ordering of quantifiers is used to express
logical implication between the related quantified
propositions. That is:
q1 ⊏ q2 |= (q1(a)(b) → q2(a)(b)) (8)
3.3.2 Contraries and Subcontraries
This system is based on the relationships obtained
between propositions and their negation. This pair
is made of a proposition and its contrary or sub-
contrary. We connect contrary and sub-contrary
pairs with the operator (̂X). A contrariness opera-
tor gives the contrary or subcontrary of a quantifier.
A contrariness operator has the following prop-
erties:
̂̂
A = A (9)
Also it associates affirmative and negative quanti-
fiers that are of the same cardinality in their respec-
tive orderings:
Â = E, P̂ = B, T̂ = D, . . . (10)
3.3.3 Mirroring Operator
The mirroring operator gives the specular element
with respect to the centre element of the set. 1 InA
the centre element is T , the mirror of the element
A, denoted by A∗, is I . Please note
((A)∗)
∗
= A = (I)∗ (11)
The same operator applies to the set E .
3.3.4 Relationship with Inner and Outer
Negation
With the mirroring and contrariness operators we
can express inner and outer negation. Using the
notation specified in Peters and Westerståhl (2006)
for inner and outer quantifiers we have:
Qˆ = (Q¬) (12)
that is the contrary or sub-contrary negation, and
(Q)∗ = (¬Q¬) (13)
Please note:
¬Q = (Q̂)∗ = ˆ(Q∗) (14)
That is the contradictory negation.
3.3.5 Existential Import
Peterson’s system assumes existential import for
the affirmative and the negative. That is every
proposition implies the existence of both the sub-
ject and the predicate. This assumption let us
maintain the logical implication between quanti-
fied propositions and gives the ordering between
quantifiers. That is:
qi < qj ≡ qi(X)(Y )→ qj(X)(Y ) (15)
3.4 The inference rules
Syllogisms are subdivided according to four fig-
ures that represent the four possible ways the two
quantified propositions can match through a term.
In what follows we will be using the lowercase
Greek letters ‘α’,‘β’ and ‘γ’ to represent term vari-
ables. A detailed derivation of syllogisms accord-
ing to the following rules will be added to Iero
(2018)
This section also contains examples of syllo-
gistic inference for intermediate quantifiers. The
examples are not strict in their syntax, sometimes
for readability we match a verb with a term con-
taining an implicit subject (e.g. “those who”)
sometimes we use the verb negation (“do not”)
in place of the predicate “are not”, sometimes we
match the singular with the plural (e.g. “vegetable”
with “vegetables”). However, nothing hinges on
such minor paraphrases.
1This is equivalent to the complement value in a set defined on an interval between 0 and 1.
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3.4.1 The Extended Square
Figure 1 displays two kinds of information be-
tween quantified propositions that contain the same
terms in the same positions:
• The relationship between truth values of the
quantified proposition.
• The order relationship between quantified
expressions.
The order relationship is based on the implication
of quantifiers. In this sense the ordering can be re-
duced to the boolean implication.
A: all P are S E: no P are S
P : almost all P are S B: few P are S
T : most P are S D: most P are not S
K: many P are S G: many P are not S
I: some P are S O: some P are not S
Contraries Subcontraries
Contradictories Implication
Figure 1: Extended Square of opposition (Peterson
2000)
3.4.2 First Figure
The first figure of syllogistic logic is structured as
shown below
Premises
first
qp1
β
α
second
qp2
γ
β
Conclusion
qc
γ
α
We will be expressing what van Eijck calls
triggers, all(β)(α) and no(β)(α), as β ⊑ α and
β ⊑ ¬α respectively. The sign ⊑ designates logi-
cal implication. For the set of quantifiers q ∈ A
q(γ)(β) β ⊑ α
(I.A)
q(γ)(α)
And indicating q̂(α)(β) as the contrary quanti-
fier of q(α)(β)
q(γ)(β) β ⊑ ¬α
(I.E)
q̂(γ)(α)
Examples For reasons of space we will be giv-
ing examples only for the first figure. It should be
simple enough to apply the schema and draw the
equivalent images for the other figures.
As an example of an inference obtained by ap-
plying the first figure, we take the sentences: “Most
humans can write their names” and “All those who
can write their name are able to write”. If we match
α with “able to write”, β with “(those who) can
write their name” and γ with “humans” we can use
the first figure (Fig. 2) to derive “Most humans are
able to write” given that the quantifier “Most” is
T ∈ A. This inference is illustrated in Fig. 3
Those who can write their name
Those who can write
Humans
Most Humans
Figure 3: Example of an affirmative syllogism of
the first figure
Similarly from “Almost all adults go to work”
and “No one of those who go to work sleep until
late”, by matching α with “(those who) sleep until
late”, β with “(those who) go to work” and γ with
“adults”, (Fig. 4), from almost_all = P we ob-
tain Pˆ = B and B = few “Few adults sleep until
late” as illustrated in Figure 5. Please note, because
of the existential import, we also derive D,G,O,
that is “Most adults do not sleep until late”, “Many
adults do not sleep until late” and “Some adults do
not sleep until late”.
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Premises
first
Q : All
β: those who can write their name
α: able to write
second
Q : Most
γ: humans
β: (those who) can write their name
Conclusion
Q :Most
γ: humans
α: are able to write
Figure 2: Schema of an affirmative syllogism of the first figure
Premises
first
qp1 : No one of
β: those who go to work
α: sleep until late
second
qp2 : Almost all
γ: adults
β: (those who) go to work
Conclusion
qc : Few
γ: adults
α: sleep until late
Figure 4: Schema of a negative syllogism of the first figure
Almost all adults
Go to work
Sleep until late
Adults
Figure 5: Example of an negative syllogism of the
first figure
3.4.3 Second Figure
The second figure of syllogistic logic is structured
as shown below
Premises
first
qp1
β
α
second
qp2
γ
α
Conclusion
qc
γ
β
Given q1 ∈ E The two inference rules are the
following
q1(γ)(α) β ⊑ α
(II.A)
q1(γ)(β)
and given q2 ∈ A
q2(γ)(α) β ⊑ ¬α
(II.E)
q̂2(γ)(β)
3.4.4 Third figure
The third figure of syllogistic logic is structured as
shown below
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Premises
first
qp1
γ
α
second
qp2
γ
β
Conclusion
qc
β
α
We have as inference rules, for q1, q2 ∈ A
q1(γ)(α) q2(γ)(β) ⊑ ((q1)(γ)(β))
∗
(III.A)
I(β)(α)
and for q1 ∈ E and q2 ∈ A
q1(γ)(α) q2(γ)(β) ⊑ (q̂1(γ)(β))
∗
(III.E)
O(β)(α)
For instance for q1 = B
B̂ = P
and
P ∗ = K
Therefore for
q2 ⊑ K ⇒ q2 ∈ {A,P, T,K}
we obtain O from (III.E)
3.4.5 Fourth Figure
The fourth figure of syllogistic logic is structured
as shown below
Premises
first
qp1
α
β
second
qp2
β
γ
Conclusion
qc
γ
α
And given q1, q2 ∈ A we have the following
inference rules:
q1(α)(β) β ⊑ γ
(IV.A)
I(γ)(α)
α ⊑ β β ⊑ ¬γ
(IV.Æ)
E(γ)(α)
α ⊑ ¬β q2(β)(γ)
(IV.E)
O(γ)(α)
3.4.6 Contradictories
The contrariness/sub-contrariness relationship in
the extended square in Figure 1 is formalised as
follows:
q
∼ (qˆ)∗
and
∼ q
(qˆ)∗
3.4.7 Chain of implication
The extended square gives logical implication for
affirmative and also for negative quantifiers (Fig-
ure 1). Interpreting vertical arrows as logical impli-
cation means that if a proposition is true all those
that follow it are true and if a proposition is false,
all propositions that precede it are false. That is
qi qi ⊏ qj
(ExI.A)qj
and
∼ qi qj ⊏ qi
(ExI.E)∼ qj
3.4.8 Metaresult
Syllogisms never derive a negated proposition, a
proposition starting with “It is not the case that”.
These propositions are obtained by applying the
relationships encoded by the square of opposition.
Therefore we can say that any quantified proposi-
tion that is before the contradictory of the result in
the linear sequence of quantifiers, both A and E ,
must be false, or be qi(X)(Y ) the inferred quan-
tified proposition, qc(X)(Y ) its contradictory, and
qx(X)(Y ) a quantified proposition that is before
the contradictory,
qx(X)(Y ) ⊑ qc(X)(Y ) ⊢
it follows that not qx(X)(Y )
(16)
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3.5 A theorem
This section introduces a theorem that can be ob-
tained immediately from the system described in
this chapter.
3.5.1 Restriction
The system so far described is composed of 5
quantities and therefore called the 5-quantities sys-
tem. This system subsumes the classical syllo-
gisms, composed by 2 quantities. However, it is
interesting to ask whether the classical syllogism
can be derived with a 2-quantities system with the
formalism given, that is with
Definition 3.3. The 2-quantities system contains
the 2 affirmatives:
A2 = {A, I} (17)
and the 2 negatives:
E2 = {E,O} (18)
Theorem 1. Syllogistic rules and A2, E2 derives
classical syllogisms with existential import
Proof. The inference rules do not change, the sets
are A2, E2. What changes is the mirroring opera-
tor, since the sets are of even cardinality. The oper-
ator, in this case is (A)∗ = I and (E)∗ = O. This
by enumeration derives Aristotle’s syllogisms with
existential import using Monotonicity rules, one of
the components of Van Eijck’s system. However,
symmetry is not used. The operators we give ob-
tain an equivalent result.
4 Conclusion and further work
We have described a logical system that amends
and extends the Monotonicity Calculus of Van
Eijck (2005). This allows us to capture the syl-
logistic and square of opposition inferences for Pe-
terson’s intermediate quantifiers. Rather than enu-
merate the syllogisms, we present a small number
of inference schemes from which instances of the
syllogisms are derivable. This deduction system is
part of the design of a logic engine of an automated
question generation system which design is out-
lined in Iero (2017). We are planning to extend the
system using more intermediate quantifiers, and by
adding relationships, in order to increase the ex-
pressive power of our logic engine.
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